Abstract: Numerous policy studies have argued that conditions have prevailed in China since the open door economic reforms of the late 1970s that have encouraged rapid growth at the expense of regional income inequality across the provinces of China. In this paper we use recently developed nonstationary panel techniques to provide empirical support for the fact that the long run tendency since the reforms has been for provincial level incomes to continue to diverge. M ore importantly, we show that this divergence cannot be attributed to the presence of separate, regional convergence clubs divided among common geographic subgroupings such as the coastal versus interior provinces. Furthermore, we also show that the divergence cannot be attributed to differences in the degree of preferential open-door policies. Rather, we find that the divergence is pervasive both nationally and within these various regional and political subgroupings. We argue that these results point to other causes for regional income divergence, and they also carry potentially important implications for other regions of the world.
Introduction
In this study we examine China's regional growth patterns using provincial-level income data. Many authors have noted that regional incomes have been diverging across China at the same time that China has opened its economy to greater international economic activity. A common argument is that the regional divergence in incomes may be due largely to geographic factors, or to differences to which provinces promote open-door policies. Using recently-developed nonstationary panel techniques, we
show that neither of these popular explanations is sufficient to explain the degree of regional divergence that China has experienced. Rather, we argue that research should focus on more fundamental causes linked to the mechanisms for rapid growth.
The empirical results are potentially significant not only for China, but also for understanding the prospects for growth and economic integration in other regions of the world that strive to develop as rapidly as China has during the last few decades. Many of the provinces of China are comparable in size to entire nations, not only geographically, but also in terms of population and economic activity.
Whereas regional incomes among individual U.S. states and among Western European countries are generally seen to be converging over time, China provides an interesting case study of an example in which regional differences have been increasing amidst rapid growth. The results of this study suggest that mere openness to international trade in goods and services alone is not likely to be sufficient to ensure regional income convergence when one takes into account production factors, such as insufficiently mobile labor, as has been an issue in China until only very recently. These findings may be important for other regional economic groups that are considering the prospects for integration in the form of greater openness to trade in goods and services and capital flows, but which have relatively limited labor flows. Important examples include the various regional economic groups in Africa, such as ECOWAS in West Africa, CEMAC in Central Africa, COMESA and SADC in Eastern and Southern Africa, as well as the ASEAN countries of Southeast Asia, and the Andean Community, CACM, CARICOM and MERCOSUR groups in the Caribbean and Latin America.
China's experience with economic growth has changed dramatically following the reforms initiated in 1978, which introduced economic incentives and opened the economy to foreign trade and investment.
In the years prior to the reforms, real per capita income grew at 2.5% per annum. Growth during this period was also quite erratic, with dramatic variations associated with the Great Leap Forward and the breaking of trade relations with the Soviet Union in 1958-60. The second half of the 1960s witnessed agricultural failures and a nationwide famine caused by the political and social chaos that followed the Cultural Revolution.
By contrast, the reforms since 1978 have unleashed a period of unprecedented rapid and steady growth, at 8.8% per annum during 1978-97 for the economy as a whole, and at 10.2% per annum for the coastal provinces, excluding the city provinces. The contrast in the growth experience between these two periods can be seen readily in figure 1 , which depicts real log per capita income for the average of the 28 provincial-level localities for which data is available going back to 1952.
In general terms, the pre-reform period 1952-77 is characterized by unsteady growth, with relatively large fluctuations in measured per capita income. These are due in large part to two distinct historical episodes. The first is the Great Leap Forward campaign of 1958-60 and the subsequent agricultural failures and a nationwide famine. The second is the Cultural Revolution of 1965-68 and the ensuing political and social chaos that followed, resutling in a large decline in growth in the latter half of the 1960s. The early 1970s were then characterized by a recovery period. By the late 1970s the growth trend of the Chinese economy improved dramatically, and it has remained high since.
The takeoff toward higher growth coincides with the process of economic reform and open-door policies adopted in 1978. However the rapid growth has also been accompanied by a dramatic increase in personal income inequality. This has stemmed from the increased emphasis on market incentives and the reversal of the "iron rice bowl" policies. Based on official statistics, the World Bank (1997) reports an increase in the Gini coefficient to 38.8 in 1995 from 28.2 in 1981. Inequalities in rural areas have been growing fastest although urban inequality has also risen sharply in the most recent period 1988-95. 1 It should not be surprising that the transition from socialism to more market-oriented policies has increased income inequality at the household level. But the fact that systematic income inequalities also appear to be increasing between provinces is somewhat more perplexing. The issue is of central concern to the Chinese authorities, as it bears directly on the success of decentralization policies and the political cohesion of the country at the national level. In September 1995 the Chinese government endorsed the view that regional inequalities have widened since the reforms. It stated that "since the adoption of reforms and open-door policies, we have encouraged some regions to develop faster and get richer, (and we have) advocated that the richer should act as a model for and help the poor. Each region has had immense economic development and the people's standard of living has had great improvement.
But for some reason, regional economic inequalities have widened somewhat." 2 Recently Young (2000) also provided compelling arguments and empirical evidence to support the idea that despite the fact that China has liberalized international trade, interprovincial trade has actually become more restrictive in the post-reform period, and that this combination can be expected to generate large regional disparities. Some empirical studies have for the most part come to the opposite conclusion.
For example, Chen and Fleisher (1996) , Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) and Raiser (1998) generally find the absence of per capita income convergence among provinces during the period from 1952-77, followed by a pattern of convergence during the post-reform period. Jian, Sachs and Warner (1996) argue that convergence among the provinces of China has been a relatively recent phenomenon, emerging strongly only since the post-reform period began in 1978. 3 Others have argued that although provincial incomes are still diverging, this can largely be accounted for by the fact that the interior provinces simply have 1 See for example Ravallion and Jian (1999), Kahn, Griffen and Risken (1999) and Yang (1999) for recent discussion of these trends in income inequality. 2 People's Daily Overseas Edition, Oct. 5, 1995, p4 3 Only fifteen provinces in their study have GDP data for the pre-reform period 1952-77.
not kept up with the fast-growing coastal regions, either due to differential degrees of openness to trade, or due simply to differences in geography associated with access to the sea.
In this paper, we argue that empirical results on Chinese provincial convergence should be reevaluated in light of recent advances in empirical methodologies for testing convergence. Specifically, we make use of the provincial income panel data set of Hseuh-Li (1999) and apply empirical techniques that explicitly account for the nonstationary time series properties of the data. These techniques allow us to obtain a fairly dramatic picture of the trends toward and away from convergence in the two periods prior to and following the economic reforms. In contrast to previous studies that have relied on conventional cross-section techniques, we find evidence in accordance with the more recent arguments put forth by Young, as well as with the pragmatic observations of policymakers in China. Specifically, in this study we find strong evidence to support the idea that although real per capita incomes were generally converging among provinces prior to the economic reforms begun in 1978, the reforms triggered a period in which provincial real per capita incomes have since been diverging rather than converging. Furthermore, we also investigate the relative growth patterns among regional subgroups, as well as among subgroups of provinces that have received differing degrees of preferential open-door policy support. On the basis of this analysis, we show that the national divergence cannot easily be explained simply on the basis of separate regional or political convergence clubs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we take a brief, informal look at the raw data to understand the nuances involved in determining whether per capita incomes are indeed converging or diverging among Chinese provinces in the pre and post-reform periods; next in Section 3 we establish a more formal set of criteria for testing convergence of provincial real per capita incomes, and we describe the empirical methodology that we employ to formally test and compare income convergence properties before and after the reforms based on recently developed techniques for nonstationary panel data analysis; Section 4 discusses and evaluates the results that we obtain; and One way to illustrate the provincial growth pattern is to examine Shanghai, the richest, as the national technology leader or frontier, in comparison with those provinces which are catching up to Shanghai, those which are falling behind, and those which are roughly growing at the same pace. Among the coastal provinces, the group known as the "five dragons"-Guangdong, Fujian, Jiangsu, Shandong and Zhejiang-have grown at a rate of more than 10% each year since 1978. Figure 2 illustrates the extent to which the average per capita income of these five provinces is rapidly approaching that of
Shanghai. The figure also shows that two other provinces have clearly been lagging behind the rest.
These two provinces are Heilongjiang, the Soviet-style heavy-industrial base in the northeast of China, and Qinghai, an inland province in the northwest of China. By the late 1980s these two provinces were overtaken by the five dragons provinces. Figure 3 depicts how, in contrast to these eight provinces, the remaining interior provinces appear to be growing along distinct but roughly parallel growth paths.
Many studies of the Chinese economy tend to categorize provinces simply into coastal versus interior groups, since historically there has been a significant difference in their relative growth rates. However, the Hsueh and Li data show that this classification may be inadequate in that it masks considerable individual heterogeneity within the categories. For example, figure 4 shows that the log per capita income gap between the coastal and interior provinces increased only slightly after 1978. By contrast, when we compare the wealthiest and poorest of each of these classifications with the group averages of the remaining provinces we see a different picture. In figure 5 we see that the income gap between the group average and the richest coastal province, Shanghai, and the poorest coastal province, Hebei, is relatively constant over time. This appears to contradict the idea that the coastal provinces behave as a single convergence club. Similarly, figure 6 shows that the income gap between the richest interior province, Beijing, and the poorest interior province, Guizhou, has even increased slightly since the 1980s.
If we think of convergence as the narrowing of interprovincial income differences, it appears that there is relatively little overall convergence among the group of all provinces when examined over the entirety of the sample period. Furthermore, even as possible regional growth clubs, the coastal provinces and interior provinces fail to converge within each group. As each of the figures illustrates, per capita growth rates, reflected in the slopes of the logged series, while differing across provinces, appear relatively stable over time since the 1978 reforms. Accordingly, the differences in growth rates appear to be fairly persistent, which implies that interregional income disparities are likely to continue to diverge.
This graphic analysis is useful in informally developing a sense of the extent of convergence or divergence present in the data. To reconcile whether the data is actually consistent with long run convergence or divergence in a formal sense, we next turn to a more systematic empirical analysis.
Panel Based Tests for Long Run Convergence
To more precisely investigate whether the data are consistent with long run convergence or divergence,
we begin with a formal definition of what we mean by the concept of long run convergence in panels such as the Hsueh and Li data. In particular, we employ a definition of income convergence in keeping with the one studied in Evans (1998) for an international panel of country-level data. This notion of convergence asks whether or not the long-run forecasts for output differences converge as the forecasting horizon increases, which implies that the long run income gap between any two provinces must be stationary.
An important implicit distinction between this empirical formalization and the informal graphical analysis of the previous section is that here in order to conclude in favor of convergence, we require that the properties of the data must be consistent with the fact that differences are eliminated eventually, and not necessarily that the differences are becoming smaller at all points in time. Clearly this less restrictive concept for convergence is somewhat more subtle, and far more difficult to detect on the basis of a casual graphical analysis. To formalize this idea empirically, for provincial income data which individually exhibit nonstationarities, one can characterize this criteria for convergence as follows.
Suppose that y it , the logarithm of per capita output for province i at time t, is difference stationary, and thus exhibits unit root behavior individually. Then any pair of provinces i and j are said to converge pair-wise if the difference y it − y jt is stationary so that y it and y jt are cointegrated. Convergence between members of a larger group of provinces is then defined analogously by requiring that every pair within the set exhibits convergence. Note furthermore that if the stationary differences between provinces have nonzero means, then this corresponds to the notion of conditional convergence, since the convergence is said to be conditional upon the province-specific fixed effects. One obvious advantage to this method of focusing on the properties of long run income gaps as the criteria for convergence is that it directly allows us to infer long run forecasts for the absence or presence of income inequalities between provinces.
For the group of Chinese provinces, one might imagine testing this condition pair-wise for all provinces within the sample and then requiring that the condition hold for each possible pair of provinces.
An obvious disadvantage of such an approach is that conventional tests for cointegration tend to have low power for such short samples, and so the probability of failing to reject the null of no cointegration for at least some pairs would be quite high regardless of the true relationship. Fortunately, as Evans (1998) demonstrates, it is possible to translate this criteria into a single criterion that should apply to the group as a whole when interpreted as a panel. Specifically, Evans shows that the criterion of pair-wise convergence for all members of panel is equivalent to the condition that the difference between the individual series, y it , and the mean value for the series across all members at each point in time,
y it , is stationary. Thus, the condition states that all members converge pair-wise if y it −ȳ t is stationary for each member i = 1, 2, ......, N of the panel. Consequently, Evans argues that the null of nonconvergence can be interpreted as the unit root null in panel unit root test.
Consequently, in this context, whether or not convergence is occurring can be evaluated by asking whether or not the autoregressive parameter β i is zero for the panel data regression given by
for i = 1, 2, ......, N; t = 1, 2, ......, T . Notice that this specification is essentially an augmented Dickey-Fuller regression applied to the panel of income differentials between the individual provinces and the mean income value of the provinces as a group. In this case the μ i fixed effects represent the individual province's average sample difference from the group mean (y it −ȳ t ), which is permitted to vary by province. The autoregressive parameter for the income differentials, β i , becomes the key coefficient for determining the presence or absence of convergence, the lagged difference terms are intended to capture higher order serial correlation in the time series process for income differentials and the number of lags, K i , are chosen in a manner to ensure that the remaining error terms ε it are serially uncorrelated.
Under this specification, rejection of the panel unit root null hypothesis
in favor of the alternative hypothesis Evans and Karras (1996) requires the autoregressive coefficient to be homogeneous under the alternative hypothesis, so that β i = β < 0. Thus, the more recent tests provide us with the additional flexibility of allowing the convergence dynamics to differ across provinces under the alternative hypothesis, which is clearly an advantage in the current context.
The distinction is achieved by the difference in the way the data are pooled to construct the statistics. 
Again, under the assumption that the individual statistics are independent, the sum of N independent Instead, the panels may be mixed in the sense that the majority of the members contain unit roots but one or two do not. In this case, we would like to know the basis for the rejection of the panel as a whole. By computing the marginal significance levels of the members individually prior to pooling the results, we can get a sense of whether or not this is the case.
Finally, the marginal significance analysis associated with the Maddala and Wu approach brings with it another important benefit. Both the Im, Pesaran, and Shin t-bar test and the Maddala and Wu Pearson-lambda test are constructed under the assumption that the income differentials are independent of one another across provinces. But in practice, it is possible that even these differentials contain feedback effects that render them dependent upon one another across provinces. In this case, these tests are not strictly valid. Fortunately, once the marginal significance levels have been computed, it is also possible to use these to produce a more conservative test that is also invariant to the presence of cross-sectional dependency. As Maddala and Wu point out, the marginal significance levels can be used to construct a test based on the Dufour and Torres (1996) criteria for the Bonferroni inequality constraint, which does not require independence across the individual members of the panel. The
Bonferroni inequality constraint indicates that the marginal significance level P for a rejection of the null hypothesis H 0 applied to the panel of N members is given by P ≤ P N i=1 p i where, as before, the p i are the marginal significance levels for the tests applied to the individual members. Dufour and Torres recommend using the criteria that p i = P N , to set the rejection level. To understand the nature of the test, consider the following. Imagine that we are interested to know whether we should reject the null hypothesis for the panel at the 10% level. Clearly, it would be a mistake to conclude that we should reject the hypothesis simply because a single member of a panel of N provinces produces a p-value less than 10%. To do so would ignore the fact that for a panel of N members, we would expect to reject at the 10% level 
Empirical Results
In this section we present and discuss the results of the formal convergence tests described in the previous section. We divide the sample of twenty-eight provinces into a pre-reform subsample for the period 1952-77, and a post-reform subsample, for 1978-97. We also consider various province subgroupings to investigate the possibility of convergence clubs in the post-reform period.
To begin, the IPS t-bar test and Maddala-Wu Fisher test are applied to equation (1) for the pre-reform period 1952-77 and the post-reform period 1978-97, respectively. Table 3 summarizes the results for the pre-reform period and post-reform periods. In keeping with the discussion of the previous section, the lag truncations for the individual ADF unit root regressions were allowed to vary by individual province in both subsamples, for both the individual tests as well as the panel based test. In each case, the lag length was chosen by a standard data dependent step down procedure, which is typically implemented for the ADF unit root test in conventional time series regressions. Specifically, the step down procedure involves starting with a sufficiently large number of lags and then sequentially eliminating the highest order lags one at a time until one of them tests significant. In our case, we allowed this step down procedure to choose a different lag truncation for each province. For the arbitrary initial starting value, we rounded off to the nearest integer of 1/5 of the sample length. Thus, for the pre-reform period, with T=26, we started with an initial "maximum" lag value of 5, and then allowed the automated data dependent procedure to choose the actual number of fitted lags, which then varied between 0 and 5. For the post-reform period, with T=20, we started with an initial "maximum" lag of 4, so that the actual number of fitted lags then varied between 0 and 4. Since both individual and panel unit root tests are well known to be sensitive to the number of lags fit, we also experimented with using maximum lag truncations that varied from 6 to 2 in the case of the pre-reform period and 5 to 2 in the post-reform period. The results for the panel were not altered by these choices. Consequently, in the interest of space, we report only the tables with results for the case with maximum truncations of 5 and 4 respectively. For the IPS tests, we conditioned the individual mean and variance adjustment terms on both the sample size and the lag truncation value that was chosen endogenously for each individual.
Consider first the results reported in table 3 for the pre-reform period. The first column to the right of the province name reports the value for the individual ADF t-statistic for the particular province.
The next column reports the associated marginal significance level, also known as the "p-value," for the reported ADF t-statistic. As discussed in the previous section, since the distribution for the ADF t-statistic is nonstandard, the p-values must be estimated by Monte Carlo simulation. Furthermore, since the size of the test under the null hypothesis is very sensitive to the sample size, as well as the number of fitted lags, we used a bootstrap to condition the Monte Carlo simulation on both the sample size and the specific number of lags that were fitted in each case. In all cases, the simulation was based on 20,000 draws from a pure random walk of length T+100. The first 100 realizations of each random walk were discarded to reduce the impact of arbitrary initial conditions, and the ADF regression was then fitted with the number of lags that had been fitted according to the data dependent step down procedure.
Notice that based on these p-values, we see that only three provinces were able to reject the unit root null at the 5% level or better, and only six were able to reject at the 10% level or better. On the other hand, we can also see from the p-values that the strength of the empirical evidence coming from the individual provinces is not neutral. Rather, although the signal from any one province is weak, it generally lies on the tail of the distribution that favors rejection over non rejection of the null hypothesis. When this evidence is accumulated in the panel, it produces a strong enough signal to warrent rejection of the null with much greater confidence. In other words, although not many provinces provided small enough p-values to support rejections on their own at the 5% or 10% level, a great many provinces were able to support rejections at say the 35% level or better. Individually, these would not be taken as sufficient evidence. However, the combined evidence of these marginally supportive provinces is sufficient to produce a rejection for the panel as a whole. outliers. Consequently, these tests support the conclusion that inter-provincial per capita incomes were converging in the sense that incomes were converging toward one another for a significant subset of provinces during the pre-reform period.
Next, consider the results for the post-reform period, which are reported in table 4. For this sub-sample, we encounter a very different situation. Although two provinces are able to reject at the 5% level or better, and four are able to reject at the 10% level or better, the pattern for the majority of provinces is now much different. Rather than being close to rejections, the majority of the test statistics are nowhere near the left tail of the distribution, and the p-values reflect this. Now, even the combined evidence does not reject the null hypothesis, and both the Fisher statistic and the Im, Pesaran, and Shin t-bar statistic reflect this. In both cases, the statistics are far from rejecting the null hypothesis. This points to the likelihood that on balance, the majority of the provinces are not converging to one another in the post-reform period since we cannot reject the panel unit root null hypothesis for the differences (y it −ȳ t ). On the other hand, the fact that a small subset of provinces do provide rejections leads us to consider the possibility that there may be subgroups for which convergence may be present. We also note that at least one province provides a rejection that is marginally consistent with the Bonferroni test at the 5% level, since
Consequently, we next consider that the possibility that the apparent absence of convergence in the post-reform period nationally can be attributed to the idea that at least some subsets of countries are converging to separate regional or policy-determined clubs. Notice that the results for the full sample of provinces already indicate that this result is unlikely, since they indicate that we cannot reject the likelihood that there is no sizeable subset of provinces which converge pair-wise within the Toward this end, we first examined various regional subgroupings for the possibility of geographicallybased convergence clubs. The designation for coastal versus interior tends to vary among studies, and so we have experimented with a number of different coastal versus interior classifications as well as other regional subgroupings. As described in table 1, strictly speaking, our sample consists of ten provinces that lie along the coast of China. Among these, the southern autonomous coastal region of Guangxi is sometimes excluded from the coastal designation and grouped with the other southwestern interior provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Likewise, the northeastern coastal province of Liaoning is occasionally excluded from the coastal designation and grouped along with the other interior Manchurian provinces of Heilongjiang and Jilin, both of which had heavily-industrialized Soviet-style economies during the pre-reform period and have tended to lag behind in the post-reform period. Finally, Tianjin and Shanghai are also sometimes excluded from the coastal group since they represent somewhat unique metropolitan areas. We experimented with each of these different coastal classifications. In the interest of space, we report in table form only two classifications, the broadest classification including all ten provinces, and the narrowest classification, including only the six non-metropolitan central coastal provinces. In table 4 we report both the individual and group results for each of these two benchmark coastal groupings. Notice that, statistically, the individual test values for the same province tends to differ depending on the grouping in which it is included. This is because when we test (y it −ȳ t ), the value forȳ t . differs depending on which other provinces are included in the group. In all cases, for each of the coastal groupings, including the other coastal groupings not reported in table form, we were unable to reject the null hypothesis that all of the (y it −ȳ t ) are nonstationary on the basis of any of the tests. In other words, the evidence strongly contradicts the presumed presence of a separate coastal convergence club regardless of which combination of coastal provinces we consider.
We also investigated the convergence properties for the interior provinces These average values range from 0.33 to 2.86, with the majority of provinces below 1.0. We divided these into three roughly equal quantiles. This produced nine "low preference" provinces with average index values below 0.5, plus nine "medium preference" provinces with values between 0.5 and 1.0, and 10 "high preference" provinces with values exceeding 1.0. The assignment of provinces into these groups is also described in table 1. As it turns out, the high preference quantile coincides exactly with the subset of all coastal provinces. Therefore, we already know, based on the geographically-defined classifications, that this subset does not contain a convergence club, as reported in table 4. As expected, the result continues to hold even when we exclude the most extreme high-preference provinces, Fujian and Guangdong, which are the only two provinces with average index values in excess of 2.0.
Similarly, we already know from this that the results for the remaining eighteen medium and lowpreference provinces are mixed, since they coincide with our benchmark group of all interior provinces.
In effect, therefore, the preferential policy classification system primarily provides us with an alternative way in which to further decompose these eighteen interior provinces, along policy groupings rather than geographic groupings. When we do this by examining the low-preference and medium-preference quantiles separately, we find another interesting result, as reported in table 6. In this case, the low-preference provinces continue to produce weak or mixed results primarily in the direction of a nonrejection. For example, while the Fisher and Bonferroni reject, the IPS clearly does not reject.
Among the individual province tests in this group, there are clearly two outliers: Gansu, which lies at the extreme left tail of the distribution with a p-value close to zero, and Qinghai, which lies at the extreme right tail of the distribution with a p-value close to one. When either or both of these northwestern provinces are excluded, the panel results uniformly fail to reject the null, leading us to conclude that it is unlikely that a significant convergence group lies within this subset. By contrast, it is the medium-preference provinces which provide us with the most likely candidate for a convergence club. Taken together, the results paint an interesting picture for the growth pattern among the Chinese provinces in the post-reform period. As a general phenomenon, per capita incomes among the provinces do not appear to be converging, but rather to be diverging in the post-reform period. Furthermore, it does not appear to be the case that this can be explained by the presence of a simple, dual-convergence club that distinguishes between coastal and interior provinces. On the contrary, per capita incomes in the coastal provinces do not appear to be converging toward one another regardless of which coastal provinces we consider. Likewise, the interior provinces as a group also do not appear to be converging, but are in general diverging. At most, there is some indication that the more geographically-isolated subset of these provinces, consisting of the six northwestern interior provinces, may not be diverging from one another, so that these may represent a small subset of interior provinces that are on a common convergence path. Similarly, when we examine the growth patterns among provinces with similar
degrees of preferential open-door policies, we find that the quantile with the most preferential treatment is growing along divergent paths. The least preferentially-treated quantile also does not appear to provide much evidence for convergence as a group. Rather, the middle quantile, with a moderate ranking for preferential policies, appears to be the most likely to contain a convergence subgroup. This quantile varies geographically among the interior provinces, and includes several of the northwestern provinces, along with a majority of central provinces.
Broadly speaking, many of these patterns might arguably be viewed as being roughly consistent 
Concluding Remarks
China presents an important case study for examining regional income disparities that accompany rapid Asia, and Latin America may need to contend with the fact that more rapid growth associated with greater openness to trade in goods and services may also be associated with greater regional income disparity. Extrapolating from China's experience, it may be the case that factor mobility, particularly labor, is an important, practical ingredient in order for rapid growth to also be accompanied by regional income convergence. Table 5 . Post-Reform Interior Geographic Subgroupings Figure 9 : Table 6 . Post-Reform Medium and Low Preference Subgroupings
